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The Fifth Eastern Partnership Summit: 
Between hyperbole and understatement 
Hrant Kostanyan 
In the midst of much political hyperbole, the 5th Eastern Partnership Summit on November 24th 
will hopefully chart a pragmatic way forward in a host of sectors for citizens living in the region. 
ummits are glitzy events that bring together the highest level of officials – the heads of 
state and government. These occasions naturally attract the interest of both the media 
and the public, raise expectations, increase tensions, create drama and heighten the 
rhetoric – but sometimes they end in disappointment. And this is exactly what the EU would 
like to avoid in the upcoming 5th Eastern Partnership (EaP) summit, which will bring together 
most of the leaders of the EU and its Eastern partners – namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – on November 24th in Brussels. The summit will be essentially 
a stocktaking exercise in which its principals reflect on the difficulties that the Partnership has 
encountered and the reforms it has undertaken to meet and mitigate the growing challenges. 
But more importantly, in the midst of the political hyperbole, the summit will aim to chart a 
pragmatic way forward to bring about tangible and positive results for citizens in a host of 
sectors ranging from energy efficiency and transport to youth employment and SMEs. 
A turbulent path to the Brussels summit  
The path to the Brussels summit has taken the Eastern Partners on a rather bumpy ride. 
Initiated by Poland and Sweden in 2009, the Eastern Partnership was the product of a delicate 
balancing act between the interests of the EU member states, some of which had prioritised 
the Southern Mediterranean and others Eastern Europe. 
The Eastern Partnership has had serious implications for domestic change in the Eastern 
neighbourhood countries. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU’s 
relationship with its Eastern neighbours has moved from a less intrusive legal order of 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) to the sphere of an extensive hard law. Being 
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modelled on the EU enlargement policy, the Eastern Partnership brought an extensive EU 
acquis with the aim of deepening the political and economic ties, and fostering people-to-
people contacts between the EU and its Eastern neighbours. It offered the possibility for visa-
free travel to the Schengen Area, and the deepest and most comprehensive contractual 
relations that the EU has ever extended to third countries through the Association Agreements, 
including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA). 
Yet three major shortcomings illustrate the challenge of the Eastern Partnership to deliver on 
its promise to serve “the shared commitment to stability, security and prosperity of the 
European Union, the partner countries and indeed the entire European continent” (Prague 
Summit Declaration, 2009). 
First, despite generally following the logic of accession, the EU’s offer has been limited and did 
not explicitly include a membership perspective. However, the preamble of the Association 
Agreements alludes to the aspirations of the Eastern Partnership countries to join the EU and 
any of them could theoretically meet the conditions of the EU membership clause enshrined in 
Art. 49 TEU. Nevertheless, after the Dutch referendum on the Association Agreement with 
Ukraine on 6 April 2016, the Netherlands insisted on a language of the European Council of 15 
December 2016 that waters down existing theoretical prospect of accession. At the 5th Eastern 
Partnership Summit, the EU is as divided as ever with the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain and 
Germany vehemently opposing membership, while the Baltic and the Visegrad Four states are 
arguing on behalf of creating a membership path precisely for the Eastern neighbours. 
Second, despite the rhetorical commitments by the leadership of the Eastern Partnership 
countries, the progress achieved in domestic political and economic reforms has been uneven 
and slow. The lack of checks and balances among three branches of government (namely, 
executive, legislative and judiciary), weak and dependent judiciaries, oligarchism and endemic 
corruption remain grave obstacles even for countries that have concluded an Association 
Agreement and a DCFTA with the EU. 
Third, Russia is challenging the EU’s role in the Eastern neighbourhood through more aggressive 
stands vis-à-vis the countries of the EaP. Russia views the Eastern Partnership as a threat that 
inspired the various ‘colour revolutions’, which convulsed the countries located in its ‘near 
abroad’ in the common Russia-EU neighbourhood. Furthermore, the Kremlin has demonstrated 
that it is willing to use any means, including military intervention, to disrupt the integration of 
the Eastern Partnership countries into the EU. The Brussels summit declaration will not have 
any innovative language on Russia. It is likely to repeat reference to the EU’s openness to 
cooperate with 3rd countries on case-by-case basis. This is a repetition of what has already 
been written in the Vilnius summit declaration.  
Expectations of neighbours vs. the EU’s offer 
The Brussels summit will not upgrade the EU’s relations with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
The milestones in the EU’s relations with the DCFTA states such as enactment of the Association 
Agreements and granting visa-free travel to the EU took place in between summits. Moreover, 
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if the latest EU-Ukraine summit is any indication, the EU will struggle to sustain what it has 
already offered. In particular, it has been challenging to continue to acknowledge the European 
aspirations of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. After some negotiations the EU member states 
agreed to acknowledge the membership aspiration of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine similar to 
Riga declaration. However, this was balanced with the reference to the European Council of 15 
December 2016. 
This comes as a disappointment to the three DCFTA countries as they would like to see at least 
some steps taken that would put them between what they have, namely the Association 
Agreements and the DCFTAs, and what they aspire to have, i.e. the EU membership 
perspective. Ukrainian government and its lobbyists for example has lobbied for the EU-Ukraine 
customs union. Although this might be an attractive proposition for the Ukrainian government 
from a political point of view, it is likely be damaging to Ukraine’s interests. Not only will the 
country lose its autonomy to negotiate free trade deals, it will also experience ‘Turkey’s 
dilemma’ of having to accept the results of the EU’s international free trade agreements 
without having a say in their content. 
Whereas Ukraine sees an upgrade in the relationship as an impetus for reform, including in the 
customs administration, many in the EU institutions and the member states view the 
implementation of the Association Agreement as a sufficient blueprint to generate change – at 
least initially. The EU’s message to associated countries is expected to be clear: implement the 
existing agreements before asking for new offers.   
The 2015 ENP review pushed the policy to one with a more pragmatic direction. In particular, 
by incorporating differentiation, the revised ENP aimed to bring a new impetus to the EU’s 
relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus. As far as non-associated countries are 
concerned, the Brussels summit would be a significant moment for EU-Armenian relations, as 
the parties might sign a new Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement. The deal 
that was negotiated after the failure of the Association Agreement, including the DCFTA, will 
chart a new course for EU-Armenian relations. Concluding the ambitious bilateral agreement 
has been a challenging process. Yet, the implementation of the agreement promises to be an 
even more daunting task and one requiring ever-tighter monitoring by the EU. Pointing to its 
positive record in implementing visa facilitation and readmission agreements, Armenia agitates 
for but is unlikely to get the visa liberalisation action plan (VLAP) during the summit. 
The ambitious nature of CEPA demonstrates that the existing narrative since 2013 that groups 
Armenia with Belarus and Azerbaijan does not take into account Armenia’s receptiveness of 
the EU’s template. More nuanced approach would differentiate not only between the DCFTA 
and non-DCFTA countries but also between the non-DCFTA states. In fact, Armenia is interested 
but not able to conclude a DCFTA with the EU because of its membership to the Eurasian 
Economic Union. Under certain conditions (e.g. WTO membership), Azerbaijan is able but not 
interested in the DCFTA. Belarus is neither interested nor able to conclude a DCFTA with the 
EU. The differentiated ENP provided for 3rd-way agreements in which the partners are invited 
to enhance their contractual relations with the EU according to their ability and desire, thus 
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doing away with the one-size-fits-all approach that characterised the Association Agreements 
and the DCFTAs. 
The deliverables for Belarus and Azerbaijan are expected to be rather modest. Belarus might 
showcase some progress achieved since the lifting of most EU sanctions and reinvigoration of 
bilateral relations. In particular, the EU-Belarus partnership priorities are likely to be ready for 
the summit. Although advocated by Belarus, the negations for bilateral agreement are not likely 
to start before the summit takes place. Nor is the agreement that is under negotiation between 
the EU and Azerbaijan likely to be concluded before the summit. 
Therefore, as far as Azerbaijan and Belarus are concerned, the bar set for the summit is not 
very high. Simply having their Presidents present at the Summit would constitute an 
achievement. The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, skipped the latest Eastern Partnership 
summit in Riga in 2015, citing his disagreement with the language of the Summit Declaration 
on Nagorno-Karabakh. The EU has delicate a balancing act to perform. If the wording of 
declaration is too favorable to Azerbaijan, the President Sargsyan might skip the summit this 
time around. Moreover, the fact that the President of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, might sign an 
ambitious agreement with the EU in the margin of the Brussels summit makes Aliyev uneasy. 
The President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, has never participated in an Eastern 
Partnership summit. The EU extended an invitation to him this time around if there are no 
major negative developments in Belarus between now and the summit. Extending an invitation 
to the President Lukashenko will rectify the longstanding double standard that the EU has 
practised by inviting Aliyev but not Lukashenko. However, even if the EU does invite 
Lukashenko, his presence at the summit is not guaranteed.   
Looking ahead 
The Brussels summit will pose a break from the tradition of constantly updating the language 
and upgrading the EU’s offer in the framework of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership. There 
will be no grandiose announcements. The EU will aim to avoid the drama of the last two Eastern 
Partnership summits in Vilnius and Riga. And beyond the glitz and glamour of the summit, the 
event will offer an opportunity to showcase the achievements since Riga. And when all the fuss 
about the summit is over, the Eastern Partnership will be able to refocus on more practical 
gains. These include a whole host of sectoral cooperation from facilitating assess to finance for 
SMEs in local currency to an extension of the Ten-T transport investment plan to the Eastern 
partners and creation of Think Tanks Forum. Energy efficiency will remain an important 
component of cooperation. A large youth package and more support to civil society should also 
be announced at the Brussels summit, while the start of negotiations on eliminating roaming 
tariffs and enormous banking fees should not have to wait too long. 
Moving forward, the relationship between the EU and its Eastern partners is likely to be focused 
on bridging the gap between the rhetoric of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the reality 
on the ground in the neighbouring countries. 
